On Monday, National Review Online published Adopt-A-Stan under the title "The War in Afghanistan Is Winnable". Same dispatch, different title.
Adopt-A-Stan is published and waiting.
Your writer,
Michael Yon
18 October 2009
By Michael Yon
The inbox was peppered with hyperlinks to Dexter Filkins’ story in the New York Times, Stanley McChrystal’s Long War. One message came from Kathryn Lopez atNational Review, asking if I had seen the article and for any thoughts.
It should be said that I respect the work of Dexter Filkins. Mr. Filkins is a seasoned war correspondent whose characterizations of Iraq ring true, while Stanley McChrystal’s Long War resonates with my ongoing experiences in Afghanistan. Despite the great length of the article, the few points that did not resonate were more trivialities for discussion than disagreements. Mr. Filkins did a fine job.
To be clear, I have developed a strong belief that the war is winnable, though at this rate we will lose. Mr. Filkins seemed to unfold a similar argument. In my view, we need more troops and effort in Afghanistan—now—and the commitment must be intergenerational.
In Mr. Filkins’ article, a couple of seemingly small points are keyholes to profound realities, and to a few possible illusions. For instance, the idea that Afghans are tired of fighting seems off. Afghans often tell me they are tired of fighting but those words are inconsistent with the bitter fact that the war intensifies with every change of season. The idea that Afghans are tired of war seems an illusion. Some Afghans are tired. I spend more time talking with older Afghans than with teenagers, and most of the older Afghans do seem weary. Yet according to the CIA World Factbook, the median age is 17.6 years; meaning half of Afghans are estimated to be this age or below. The culture is old, but the population is a teenager. Most Afghans today probably had not reached puberty when al Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks. Eight years later, Afghanistan is more an illiterate kid than a country. The median age for the U.S. is given at 36.7. In addition to the tremendous societal disconnect between Americans and Afghans, there would be a generational gap even if those distant children were Americans. Clearly this could lead to frustrations if we expect quick results.
We ask Afghans for help in defeating the enemies, yet the Afghans expect us to abandon them. Importantly, Mr. Filkins pointed out that Afghans don’t like to see Americans living in tents. Tents mean nomads. It would be foolish for Afghans in “Talibanastan” to cooperate with nomadic Americans only to be eviscerated by the Taliban when the nomads pack up. (How many times did we see this happen in Iraq?) The Afghans want to see us living in real buildings as a sign of permanency. The British at Sangin and associated bases live in temporary structures as is true with American bases in many places. Our signals are clear. “If you are coming to stay,” Afghans have told me in various ways, “build a real house.” “Build a real office.” “Don’t live in tents.” We saw nearly the opposite in Iraq where pressure evolved to look semi-permanent. The Dr. Jekyll–Mr. Hyde situation in Iraq seemed to seriously catch hold by 2006 or 2007, by which time Iraqis realized we were not going to steal oil and might decide to pull out while leaving them ablaze in civil war.
A great many Iraqis wanted to know that we would stay long enough to help them stand, but were not planning on making Iraq part of an American empire. It became important to convey semi-permanence, signaling, “Yes we will stay and yes we will leave.” Conversely, Afghans down in the south, in places like Helmand, tend to have fond memories of Americans who came mid last century, and those Afghans seem apt to cooperate. That much is clear. But Afghans need to sense our long-term commitment. They need to see houses made of stone, not tents and “Hesco-habs.”
It’s crucial to hold in constant memory that Afghanistan is the societal equivalent of an illiterate teenager. The child-nation will fail unless we are willing to adopt the people. Many Afghans clearly hope this will happen, though of course we have to phrase it slightly differently. Afghans are, after all, proud and xenophobic. They are not just xenophobic but also afghanophobic. Most houses are built like little Alamos.
Half-solutions failed in Iraq and are failing in Afghanistan. There will be no cheap, easy or quick compromise that will lead to long-term success in AfPak. Erroneously adopting a paradigm that scales back to a counterterrorism approach would be like dispatching the potent but tiny Delta Force to the Amazon jungles with orders to swat mosquitoes. We can give them every Predator and Reaper in the arsenal, yet twenty years from now they’ll still be shooting Hellfires at mosquitoes. Gutting mid-level enemy leadership has been very effective in Iraq and Afghanistan, but only in a larger context. Using strictly a counterterrorism approach, we’ll end up killing relatively zero mosquitoes—the birthrate alone will see that we never win—before coming down with war malaria and nothing will change. Counterterrorism in today’s context remains important but CT is only one of many subheadings in the great accounting. It’s time for CT to crawl into the backseat, not take the wheel. Afghanistan was a special operations playground for more than half a decade. Nobody can argue that special operations forces were not given plenty of assets and discretion with special affections from the White House.
They also got more than a half-decade of free press passes. Many people argue that the press lost the war in Vietnam, but that argument has no fizz in Afghanistan. Nobody knows that better than Stanley McChrystal, who today is asking for more troops, not fewer. We need to provide General McChrystal with the resources to win and nobody is in a better position to know what he needs.
If Afghanistan is to succeed, we must adopt it. We must adopt an entire country, a troubled child, for many decades to come. We must show the Afghans that together we can severely damage the enemies, or bring them around, and together build a brighter future. The alternative is perpetual war and terrorism radiating from the biggest, possibly richest and most war-prone drug dealers the world has ever seen, and what could eventually reverse and become the swamp that harbors the disease that eventually kills Pakistan, leaving its nuclear weapons on the table.
Adopting this child-nation means more than the relatively simple task of building security forces bankrolled by foreign governments. Afghanistan cannot finance its police and army, much less the education and vast infrastructure needed to fashion and fuel a self-sustaining economy. The Coalition has already adopted the Afghan security forces and this remittance arrangement is perpetual until we squeeze the account and watch it die, or Afghanistan stands. The illiterate people of Afghanistan are multiplying like rabbits, and so thousands of schools, teachers and entire educational infrastructure must be raised up; uncontrolled population growth, among Afghanistan’s countless other problems, is born in the bed of ignorance. Only through education and opportunity, and eventual meritorious inclusion into the international community—if meager—can narcotics production, criminality, warlordism and fanaticism be eroded and whittled back. By adopting Afghanistan, bringing peace and creating a nucleus for progress, the many private donors who profoundly help develop countries such as Nepal can operate freely to spread seeds of civilization not just in Afghanistan, but in the region.
Finally, we are not the Russians, nor the failed Soviet Union. It is important to learn from Soviet success and failures, but comparing too closely Coalition efforts to theirs quickly becomes silly. The Coalition can succeed where the Soviets failed, and it should be remembered that the Soviets failed in the “easy” places where democracy now thrives, such as Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and a distinguished list of others who this moment are helping in Afghanistan, and whose countries are today thriving and where we are welcome.
I remember Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and others during the dark days. It is no wonder to me that the Soviets failed while freedom and democracy succeeded. People who saw Prague then and can see it today likely will have great difficulty explaining the differences to the uninitiated. The Coalition in Afghanistan is largely comprised of nations who have suffered greatly in recent times. They get it.
We should adopt Afghanistan for the long term. If not, there will be perpetual and growing trouble. This Coalition can succeed in Afghanistan where others failed.
COMMENTS:
Clarity, sweet clarity
the long war
You Get It, but will They?
I outlined a plan to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton regarding this issue but have heard nothing back for 6 months now. A lot of us Baby Boomers are looking for a cause to give ourselves to similar to the Peace Corp in the 1960s. Personally I am sick and tired of catering to a bunch of 'entitled' good for nothings who complain about the free medical care I give them every day. The Afghans by contrast treated me like a true hero when I was there.
Take Care and watch your back.
Sopt on mate
Permanent Construction
Wow
Well Done
Christian-Grandfather-American
How could our small community of Farmersville, TX adopt a community there and trade stories and finances to uplift both? Money will be the cure-all but pictures and thoughts would tie us together and make us understand the cultures that are different but have needs and even desires that are alike. What other items could we trade that could make a difference to us and them?
Christian-Grandfather-American
To what end?
I agree completely with most of your assessment. However, I must ask 'to what end?' Even if we make a 50 or 100 year commitment and we 'leave' Afghanistan a perfect, secure, functioning democracy, what does that do for the US in the even-longer term? Surely denying Al Qaida a playground can't be the only thing we accomplish. Al Qaida doesn't need Afghanistan - they have almost all of northern Africa to run around. Yes, Pakistan and Afghanistan can be considered a single issue on some levels - enter the nuclear problem. But, left to their own design, does anyone beleive that the Taliban has the will or means to go after Islamabad? Would/could Al Qaida?
Keep up the great reporting and keep your powder dry - we need you.
Pictures
You deserve a Pulitzer
I know some of the Special Forces that were the first in the country and a number of the 82nd Airborne. Our country is blessed with men and women of courage and patriotism in the best sense of the word. I thank you for honoring my friends who deserve all the love and respect we can give them. But our best weapons are schools and hospitals and genuine friendship that sticks with them for the long haul.
Thank your for having the courage to tell it without the political spin. Thank you for letting see through your eyes. You do deserve a Pulitzer.
What to do?
If we are trying to nationbuild a democracy, it will take huge amounts of time, blood, and money (and willpower/support at home). Their Constitution will have to be radically revised. In fact, with so little to work with, we would be literally starting from scratch.
Enemy strengths are well documented. They own the mountains and control the roads at will. They are living with the people. We play to their strengths by staying on our FOBs, away from the populations and are vulnerable when we go out. Our strengths are Satelllite, electronic, and UAV surveillance, the ability to strike from the sky at will, and much bigger bombs. Yet we handcuff ourselves with the ROE.
If our objective is to deny AQ reentry and training sites, we have the ability to do that remotely, supplemented by CIA ground assets.
Give McChrystal the troops he requests to blunt this fall offensive. In a month or so, it will not be fighting weather. Use the "downtime" to bribe enemy factions to not oppose us...it worked in Iraq. Develop intel assets. Convince Kharzai to fight corruption.
Consolidate
Trackbacked / Linked
http://www.thunderrun.us/2009/10/from-front-10202009.html
Eventual Betrayal
That is the fate that awaits the foolish Afghans who trust our uncommitted nation. We will abandon them, long before the fight is over, and all those who foolishly trusted us will be slaughtered like farm animals.
The PEOPLE of the U.S. need to commit to this fight. Not the politicians, not the military, but regular everyday Americans. If we aren't going to allow this fight to be continued, then lets not F**k over more Afghans by getting them to side with us. Afghans who could live some semblance of a life under a Taliban, which is probably better than getting your head sawn off for having trusted the words of a capricious and unprincipled nation.
Make a Video, Michael
Someone, and I mean you, needs to make a compelling video of the situation on the ground there to humanize the Afghans. That is really the only hope of reversing the trend of dwindling public sentiment. No news media will do it: they want out.
I hate to say it, but if you could focus on the fact that large numbers of Aghans are, in essences, caucasians and not arab that would probably help. Watch our news channels. Little blue-eyed girls pull at America's heart strings like nothing else.
I'm not asking you to make propaganda, but tell the story of the Afghans and what they face and why they need a generational commitment.
How can the US construct a sustainable strategy?
Now, how does this work in Afghanistan. We have been at this long war for eight years, mostly wasted in and on IRAQ. So now the American people are “tired” of the Afghanistan effort. We have been fighting with a too small volunteer Army. Grinding the volunteers and their equipment into a fine dust that mirrors Afghanistan and IRAQ. Do we need a draft to bring our forces up to the levels necessary to establish a sense of full time sustainment in Afghanistan? Can we fight this thing with a smaller yet permanent footprint? I don’t know and hope someone has the answers.
Sean Wrote: We will abandon them, long before the fight is over, and all those who foolishly trusted us will be slaughtered like farm animals.
Let's send enough troops. whatever it takes, to roust and kill the group of terrorists and their coalition, that flew the planes into the World Trade Center buildings, the Pentagon and the plane that was downed by the passengers in PA and killed thousands of Americans and other nationals on 9/11/01.
Remember, President Bush said he would do this that day on that pile of rock in NY and that he would go into ANY country that harbored their ilk, with, or without permission....but we stopped at Pakistan So, let's get it done and move on. We can leave a large coalition contingent of (UN) troops in Afghanistan after the war is won, to insure security and build the buildings, roads and infrastructure.
If the current admin and others to follow, do not buy into this effort, then Sean will be right and they Afghan people will pay with their blood, just like the South Vietnamese did. I hope Sean is wrong this time!
Thanks Michael for creating this forum with the news we need to hear! Be safe! Maddy
Ewakahuna
...
I hate like anything to see America "adopt" Central Asia (...really, it's more than just Afghanistan...it's that whole tribal, medieval part of Asia) for the next couple of generations or so. Breeding like rabbits (..I'd say fish is more like it..) will create an entitled population in no time; and they will be everlastingly sending tentacles out to our Treasury and expecting America to proffer the lives of our men and women fighting on their behalf. Not to mention the inherent corruption, and pervasive drug cultivation. We can't beat that "establishment". I'm not sure we can "win" amidst that teeming cauldron.
I was taught in school way back in the middle of the last century that one cannot legislate social change. Any local governments set up in Central Asia under our auspices, judging from the media accounts about voting in Afghanistan (if these are a true indication of what's going on there now) bodes ill in this needed "social change" department.
Yes, I know our shores are in jeopardy right now and will continue to be so. But can we not isolate and contain this nasty area as we did the Soviets during that long war? Have we not advantageous technology, and superbly trained and motivated special forces? But, our resources are finite.
Realizing that these central Asian artificial borders were created by colonial French and British Foreign Offices, and recognizing that the English, at least, have troops in combat there, why must it be ....America....stepping in here, there, everywhere, and enduring the international scorn and backbiting politics, and always having to cope with all this hypocrisy?
Others are always too willing to let America do the heavy lifting. This American thinks we're being used.
The American Burden
However, while I found the substance of this post to be characteristically enlightening, the condescending tone you adopt when you refer to the Afghans seems to me like something from the days of the British Empire, like Rudyard Kipling's "The White Man's Burden." I am not comparing the U.S. to the British Empire. Just be aware that it is dangerous to think too lowly of the people there. Using your analogy, though, remember that children are the fastest learners. The people could very well surprise you, perhaps in this presidential run-off (even I think that's unlikely, though).
That said, this article was interesting and informative, and I hope that you will continue to provide us with your excellent coverage of the situation over there. And please, if you see something wrong in what I said, correct me. You certainly know more than I do about what is going on. I just hope to give you the perspective of a fresh pair of eyes. Thank you.
looking from the outside in.
MD, FACS
...
people, AS WELL AS THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, is at stake.
The native Afghanistans, in my opinion, want freedom from the Taliban, who want only to use them.
They are indoctrinating children to fight and hate Americans.
Afghanistan
That is nowhere close to enough to 'adopt'. the 'stan. To work a Conventional CT ops plan such as McCrystal wants, it would take between 500,000 and 1 million soldiers, based on a population of 25 million. McCrystal knows that, which means he is being deceitful and trying to 'rock soup' his way up to the required numbers. That is what was done in Vietnam and labeled 'mission creep'.
Where are those troops coming from? What are they going to do when they get to the 'stan?
Nobody in this administration has ever voiced a Strategy or operational objective for the 'stan. No evidence that anyone in the White House even knows there is a difference between strategy and operations. How many riles will it take to cram democracy down the throats of the 'ganis?
The real risk in Afghanistan isn't of another Vietnam, but another Bataan. How long would a President as weak as Obama stand up under the daily, prime time beheading of US troops? Do you think Stanley has ever heard of Yorktown or Stalingrad or any of the countless other places where superior military forces were foced to surrender by having their supply lines cut?
Afghanistan is a fiction, not a nation. Nothing America can do will make it a nation in less then 3 generations. So forget nation building and CT. The reason we are in the 'stan is to prevent terrorist groups from using it for a 'safe haven'. So go with that and use an area denial ops plan.
Get the Army out ( did you know that the US Army has a patriot battery in the 'stan? That is to shoot down all those Taliban fighter bombers!), put in Marines and Special Forces and hunt bugs. Use the 'stan as a very advanced AIT. With enough live fire drills to make everybody happy.
After all, Marines love tracking down things and killing them. Gani's love tracking down things and killing them. Terorists love tracking down things and killing them. Everybody happy.
The Down and Dirty
Permanent structures demonstrate commitment and here we have inculcated ourselves with the belief a small footprint would be necessary in this battlefront with terror. Just goes to show to win the peace all we have to do is listen to the indigenous population.
One more thing...Great pics!
Kudos,
Dave
Logistics...
I'm heartened to read here that someone remembers Bataan. Our inevitable Asian withdrawal must be organized very, very carefully and simultaneously morphed into a special ops and remote aerial-controlled leadership-killing effort without massed troops. This can also take generations, but is more efficient. Asian demographics are indeed against us.
Afghanistan is indeed a fiction, that fictitious border hand drawn, if I'm not mistaken, by Winston Churchilll while he was Foreign Secretary. I wish people would also read up and refresh themselves on the Sykes-Picot Agreement and also the widespread carve-up of Central-and West-Asia after the First world War when we defeated the Ottomans who were allied with the Germans. Look up that old Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway....the Paris-Simplon-Orient Express to Instanbul.....other commercial tentacles, British Petroleum....Esso...on and on. A very complicated milieu.
Remember, these remained basically tribal and ethnic and religious districts shifting over the centuries, until Colonialism settled in and made superficial alterations to suit the limited perceived needs of the day. This primitive cultural inertia remains immense; and we Americans, particularly this naive and vaporous administration, are bound for disappointment if we think we can make lasting social changes in our favor in this kaleidoscopically changing area. I've not even mentioned the American lives at huge risk in large scale battles. I think our European associates know this better than we do, they have much longer memories of ultimately unsatisfactory results. Review all the British, French, and Soviet Euro-Asian adventures here. Then, their current lukewarm participation makes more sense. But, don't expect our European associates to say this openly. But surely, that is discussed beyond the eager ears of the media.
Lastly, that logistics morass....take a look at a globe, not a flat paper map, and a better perspective is apparent regarding the length of the supply lines required, both surface and aerial, to maintain the mountainous stockpiles of materiel an army requires for extensive mobility over difficult terrain. Forward bases in areas of questionable loyalty to America., on and on.
And, keep 9/11 freshly in mind, don't think our Islamic terrorist enemies aren't planning more.
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